Zapraszamy do zapoznania się ze SPISEM TREŚCI zeszytu 4 z 2016 roku.

LARS KARL
University of Leipzig

Centre for the History and Culture of East Central Europe
Imam Shamil as Memorial Figure and Historiographical Topos:
Narratives and Counter-Narratives as an Area of Conflict within Imperial Borderlands

The paper focuses on functions and effects of official politics of history and remembrance culture in Soviet Union and early post-Soviet Russia. Central elements are the re-codification, medialisation and orchestration of ‘history’ in a multi-ethnic state. This reflects the use of imperial politics of history as a strategy for dominance, especially in its Muslim regions. One of the most remarkable and, in regard to its re-coding and transformation, most complex historical narratives in the non-Russian periphery is illustrated by the figure of Shamil (Shamuyil; 1212-1287 AH [1797-1871]), the third and most famous and successful imam (leader) of the Muslim resistance to the Russian occupation of the North-Eastern Caucasus. Between 1834 and 1859 he led Chechens, Avars and other people in the region against the Russian armies with such remarkable skill that some historians regarded him as ‘the greatest guerrilla leader in the history of warfare’. The paper highlights images of Shamil from its beginnings after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus to Stalin’s death. Its main part, however, is dedicated to the Shamil renaissance during late perestroika, as well as to the use of the image of Shamil as a contested figure of remembrance in newly independent Chechnya and beyond. Russian and Soviet press, (late) Soviet historiography and recent publications make up a broad base of sources and literature.

MAŁGORZATA PRZENIOSŁO
Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach
Instytut Historii

The Authorities of Stephen Bathory University in Vilnius 1919–1939

In the interwar period the scope of power of the authorities of major Polish universities were defined by the laws on higher education schools. There were two such legal acts: of July 1920 and of March 1933. The act of 1920 was quite liberal one and granted a large scope of autonomy to universities, such as the election of university’s authorities. The act of 1933 much restricted this autonomy, and gave the Minister of Religion and Public Education the right to vote decisions concerning the election of university’s vice-chancellor. The Stephen Bathory University in Vilnius was founded in 1919, and had six faculties. Throughout the whole interwar period it was the smallest of all Polish
universities, both as to the number of its students, and its professors. In this period the post of vice-chancellor was hold by thirteen persons; seven of them was from the two largest faculties: Faculty of Mathematics an Nature – four, and Faculty of Medicine – three. Two vice-chancellors were from the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, and Faculty of Theology – each, despite the fact that the latter had only a few professors. Only the Faculty of Fine Arts did not introduce its professor on the post. A large part of the authorities’ members of Stephen Bathory University, while holding their position, acted in a responsible and restrained way, despite the fact that the elections were often influenced by political considerations. Quite often the university authorities faced very difficult problems, not only related to the functioning of the university, but also of political and social nature. A particular challenge were, for example, protests of 1930 caused by the so-called Brześć cause, and those of 1933 against a new law on n higher education schools, as well as anti-Jewish movements of the thirties. Usually the authorities, through the joint effort of different university organs, were able to solve those problems. There were, however, cases of dismissal of vice-chancellors or deans caused by the impossibility of finding a solution. This was the case, for example, in 1937 after the anti-Jewish unrest.

PRZEMYSŁAW JAGIEŁA
(Leverkusen)

Relations between Officers and Officer Cadets of the Polish Army in Wehrmacht POW Camps during World War II

After the lost war of 1939 Polish soldiers were taken prisoners either by the Germans or Russians. It is estimated that ca. 420 thousand Polish officers, officer cadets and privates became inmates of the Wehrmacht POW camps. Due to economic needs, but also national and racial considerations, the Third Reich did not intend to comply with a traditional idea of captivity. As a result, the international laws (the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929), protecting prisoners of war were repeatedly violated. It could be assumed a priori that in a situation of potential risk to life, Polish soldiers created a common front to help and support one another. Yet, the examples of relations between officers and officer cadets in German captivity reveal that it was not always the case. Officer cadets formed a specific group among the Polish POWs, for initially their POW status was problematic for the German authorities. The Germans could not decide whether cadets should be treated as officers and as such should be kept in POW camps for officers only (oflags, from German: Offizierslager), or be treated as mannschaft and kept together with non–commissioned officers and soldiers at stalags. Thus, they were placed both in oflags and stalags. In consequence, this dubious question was settled to the disadvantage of
officer cadets and a majority of them were transferred from oflags to stalags and labour commands, where they were subjected to forced labour. In solving this problem, the Wehrmacht was indirectly helped by Polish officers from oflags. The so– called verification committees active in camps for officers officially confirmed the non– officer status of officer cadets, and at the same time they were taking away their certificates of promotion to the rank of second lieutenant occasionally issued by some commanders during the 1939 war; the whole was completed by a controversy over a pay for officer cadets withdrawn from officers’ contributions, and a general unfriendly attitude of some officers (especially those of higher rank) towards their “younger colleagues”. Being treated as “stalag prisoners” was regarded by officer cadets as a kind of degradation, for they thought that they had officer rights in the Polish Army and for this reason should be regarded as officers, but this did not correspond with the truth. In fact, their status in captivity was regulated by the military laws of the Second Polish Republic, which did not provide for the possibility for them of being treated as officers. The article attempts to present that, despite the actual POW status of officer cadets, it were officers who had a great impact on their fate in Wehrmacht camps, for they could influence the Germans torecognise the officer status of cadets. But instead, they contributed to their transfer to stalags and labour commands. And we cannot be surprised at this attitude of Polish officers, for this community was divided by animosities even in captivity. For those officers matters of honour were the most important. The example of relations between cadet officers and officers in captivity is yet another example of hermetism of the officer corps in the Second Polish Republic and of centrifugal splitting of POW’s communities. This, in fact, could have been beneficial only for Germans, who gained an additional labour force in the persons of officer cadets.

PIOTR M. MAJEWSKI
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
JAN VAJSKEBR
Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, Praha

Situation in the General Government in the light of German police statistics. An attempt at quantitative analysis

The article presents an analysis of German police reports from the General Government, unknown to historians, which are kept in the National Archives (Národní archiv) in Prague. The statistical data contained in the documents present a relatively complex picture of the public order in this part of the occupied Polish territory seen
from the perspective of the German security services. The most important problems include the number of armed incidents, which between January 1942 and April 1944 increased 45 times, reaching 263 “assaults” a day. From the beginning of 1940 to the spring of 1944 there was over one hundred thousand armed incidents, with as much as 42 percent of them in the Lublin district, while the most quiet were Cracow district (6%) and Galicia (9%). It can be estimated that only ca. 10 percent of those incidents were of political nature, the rest were robberies. The analysed documents include also the amount of losses sustained by the occupant. It results that in the General Government between the early 1940 to the end of November 1944 at least 1384 Germans were killed and 990 functionaries of the Polish and Ukrainian auxiliary police services. (The data, however, do not include i.a. the losses suffered by the Germans while suppressing the Warsaw Uprising, and the losses of Wehrmacht in police operations from March 1943 on.) A substantial majority of Germans was killed after 1942, while in the first three years of the occupation they sustained relatively small losses in the General Government. It is possible to estimate on the basis of the analysed reports also the number of victims of the German retaliatory operations. From July 1942 to the end of November 1944 they brought about at least 43 545 victims, excluding the people killed during the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising and Jews murdered during anti–partisan operations. Ca. 40 percent of them were civilians. In addition, almost 60 thousand people were arrested, and over 40 thousand ‒ deported to forced labour.

MICHAŁ ZGŁOBICA
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny

Did unemployment really not exist in People’s Poland?

A liquidation of unemployment was one of the fundamental banners of the communist ideology. Indeed, the period of the Polish People’s Republic contributed to the solution of this problem in its social dimension. But there were still in Poland areas poorly industrialized, undercapitalized and suffering from underdevelopment of commerce and services. And although there were not numerous in the scale of the whole country, it was there that throughout the whole period of 1944‒1989 unemployment existed, and its main victims (especially from the early 1960s ) were women. This fact, however, was little known both before and after 1989, although in recent years the interest of historians in problems of labour market under the People’s Poland has increased. The present article sheds light on the centres of local unemployment at that time and explains why it was impossible to liquidate them. The author does not shun the difficult task of macroeconomic analysis and discusses the authorities’ attitude towards the problem of lack of work and the necessity to provide employment for
young generations of post–war baby boom entering the working age. He also addresses the phenomenon of quite widespread fear of unemployment in Poland in the second half of the 1950s.

JERZY KOCHANOWSKI
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny

“Everyone wants to find some way of living”. Money, poverty, and richness in (post)October Poland (1956–1957)

While political aspects of the 1956‒1957 “thaw” were blurred soon afterwards, social changes and modernizations — from the strengthening of private sector through a development of motorization and changes in consumption to conscious motherhood — were of lasting nature, and their consequences were felt throughout the following decades. The present article, while not aspiring to be a thorough economic analysis, indicates — with a full knowledge of its superficiality and taking into consideration only selected aspects — one of the most important and at the same time more rarely noticed problems of post–October reality — the problem of money! In the mid–1956, the attitude of both the state authorities and the people to finances in a broad sense of the word changed. Money became an element of open debates, a real tool of politics, a determinant of social stratification, and an object not only of desire and envy, but also of dispute. Not without significance was also a fact that in autumn of 1956 it was made legal for Polish citizens to keep foreign currency. The article focuses on the interactions — with a common “financial” denominator — between the authorities trying to prevent inflation (although significantly rising income of people at the same time) and the society, rather than on the financial policy of the government. These processes occurred against the backdrop of broadly–understood consumption. And while for the authorities it served to reduce the inflation bias, for people it was a way of recovering from the Stalinist period and of achieving a higher standard of living. To this end various adaptation strategies were developed, such as additional jobs, illegal incomes of various kinds, including operations with foreign currencies. But both the (temporary) democratisation of political life, and the evident desire of some people to get richer and buy more goods revealed huge spheres of poverty and at the same time of the lack of official procedures to fight against this phenomenon.

KRZYSZTOF OBREMSKI
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
Instytut Literatury Polskiej

Film “Boleslaus the Brave” — relations between the Polish People’s Republic and the Church

The article analysis the film entitled “Boleslaus the Brave” (directed by Wojciech Lesiewicz; produced in 1971, and released in December 1972) as an element of the relations between the Polish People’s Republic and the Catholic Church — an 11th–century antagonism of the God’s anointed could have been understood as a historical context of one of the most important problems of the whole half–century of the People’s Poland. A film desecration of the status of King Boleslaus the Brave was related to the beginning of the action in medias res, because the an omission of all the events preceding the conflict made it much easier to construct an opposition between the early Piast Poland and the contemporary Church. The film was released almost as if a “posthumous child”: it was conceived already during the open fight for the souls of people (under Władysław Gomułka), but was distributed at the beginning of the decade of moral and political unity of the nation (Edward Gierek). It is impossible to distinguish the purposes of the film makers, the aims of the propagandists and reactions of the audience. The first and the second co–formed a community more divided functionally than ideologically, and the third formed a very heterogeneous group: Catholics should recognise Stanislaus as a saint martyr and patron of Poland, while the party people — as a Church dignitary who wanted to rule Poland (in the same way as the Catholic Church hierarchy wanted to rule the souls of Polish citizens). A general, although not directly formulated message of the film was: who sided with the Catholic Church, was against not the Polish People’s Republic itself, but against the Polish State. And on the contrary: who thought himself a patriot, should at least keep the Church at a distance.

MACIEJ SZUMOWSKI
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny

Theoretical basis of political repercussions of revisionist methodology of history. Main problems of Le catéchisme révolutionnaire (1971) by François Furet

Revisionist historiography of the French Revolution, developed in the 1970s, had a significant impact on the French public life. First, it brought about criticism of the sources of French modernity, including the Jacobean revolutionary tradition, and questioning of the legitimation of a part of the French intellectual formation. Secondly, revisionism contributed to the transformation of a political discourse into an object of scientific research and journalistic distrust. The basis for its methodology was a post–structuralist context of controversies over the relationship between the ideology and material conditions, between words and things. Whereas a consequence of a changed
paradigm was a demonstration of irrationality of the discursive order and a challenge of the possibility of power legitimation through some social categories, which would generate “populist” ideology rather than political legitimization.

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Lars Karl
University of Leipzig
Centre for the History and Culture of East Central Europe
Ritterstraße 26
04109 Leipzig

Małgorzata Przeniosło
Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach
Instytut Historii
ul. Żeromskiego 5
25-369 Kielce

Piotr M. Majewski
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa

Jan Vajskebr
Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, Praha
Siwiecova 2428/2
130 00 Praha 3-Žižkov

Michał Zgłobica
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa

Jerzy Kochanowski
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa

Krzysztof Obremski
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
Instytut Literatury Polskiej
ul. Fosa Staromiejska 3
87-100 Toruń

Maciej Szumowski
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa

Eugeniusz Niebelski
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski
Instytut Historii
Al. Racławickie 14
20-950 Lublin

Włodzimierz Lengauer
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa

Małgorzata Karpińska
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa

Tomasz Leszkowicz
Polska Akademia Nauk
Instytut Historii
Rynek Starego Miasta 29/31
00-272 Warszawa

Tomasz Kizwalter
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa

Janusz Żarnowski
Polska Akademia Nauk
Instytut Historii
Rynek Starego Miasta 29/31
00-272 Warszawa

Przemysław Pazik
Collège d’Europe
ul. Nowoursynowska 84
00-001 Warszawa

Rafał Matuszewski
Universität Heidelberg Seminar für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik
Marstallhof 4
69117 Heidelberg

Jan Błachnio
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Historyczny
ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28
00-927 Warszawa